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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING 
THAT THE MATEUSES OWED NO DUTY TO MRS. 
JACKSON BY IMPROPERLY FOCUSING SOLELY 
ON WHETHER THE CAT HAD BITTEN ANYONE 
BEFORE. 
a. Under Utah law, the Mateuses owed a duty to Mrs. Jackson to 
prevent the cat attack. 
The Mateuses incorrectly argue that solely because they claim to have no 
knowledge of their cat biting another person prior to the attack inflicted on Mrs. Jackson, 
that they had no duty to Mrs. Jackson. The district court similarly erred in so ruling. This 
Court has ruled that whether a duty exists depends on several factors, of which 
foreseeability is only one element.1 AMS Salt Indus, v. Magnesium Corp., 942 P.2d 315, 
321 (Utah 1997). The other elements that must be taken into account in determining 
whether the Mateuses owed a duty to Mrs. Jackson include: 1) the likelihood of the 
injury, 2) the magnitude of the burden of guarding against it, 3) the consequences of 
placing that burden upon defendant, 4) voluntary conduct which increases the risk of 
harm, and 5) general policy considerations. Id. (citations omitted.) Each of these 
1
 In AMS Salt Indus.. 942 P.2d at 32 L Justice Russon wrote that w'[s]everal 
other factors may be relevant in ascertaining whether there is a duty.. . . foreseeability can 
be one of those factors. It is not, however, the only factor." 
1 
applicable elements argues in favor of imposing a duty on the Mateuses requiring them to 
control their cat and holding them liable for their failure to do so. 
/. The likelihood of injury. 
In this case, there was only one piece of evidence before the district court 
regarding the likelihood of cats to attack and injure human beings. That evidence came in 
the form of deposition testimony from a medical professional, Dr. Eric Vanderhoof, who 
has experience treating cat bites: 
Q. Just curious. This is my first case I've dealt with a cat bite. 
A. They're not uncommon. Cat bites are pretty virulent. 
Human bites and cat bites are pretty bad. The problem with 
cat bites is that they have such sharp little teeth that when they 
bite, the bacteria — because their mouths are filthy - gets 
lodged inside there and has no way to get out. When you 
have a dog bite you sort of lay the thing open and you have a 
big open wound. That way the pus can't stay trapped and it 
can get out. If you're not draining pus from your body, 
oftentimes that's not a big problem. But when it gets trapped 
underneath, that's when you get into trouble. So cat bites tend 
to be more problematic than a lot of animal bites. 
(R. 166.) 
The evidence from Dr. Vanderhoof is that cat bites are common, or, in other 
words, that the likelihood of a cat biting someone is high. The defendants have presented 
only unsupported argument in their brief asserting that tabby cats are not prone to have 
vicious tendencies, or that cats do not harm humans. Those assertions are not only 
unsupported, but are refuted by the evidence of record. The evidence in this case shows 
2 
that cat bites are common and dangerous to humans. Therefore, the unrefuted evidence in 
this case shows that there is a likelihood of injury if a cat is not controlled by its owner. 
//. The magnitude of guarding against cat bites. 
The magnitude of guarding against cat bites by an owner is minimal, and by the 
same token, if cat bites are guarded against, innocent persons will be saved a great deal of 
pain and suffering as well a potentially devastating financial consequences. Contrary to 
the Mateuses' unsupported assertions, reasonable cat owners do not simply allow their 
animals out of their control. Mrs. Jackson owns four cats that are kept inside her house 
where they can be properly controlled and where the Jacksons can ensure that the animals 
do not come into contact with other persons and other animals in an uncontrolled or 
unsupervised situation. 
The burden to a cat owner of guarding against cat bites is slight. With animal 
ownership comes a level of responsibility to control the animal and protect others from 
that animal. However, the Mateuses decline to accept any responsibility to control their 
animal and, in fact, argue that it is impossible for a cat owner to control the animal. The 
Mateuses argue that everyone around them, other than themselves, must accept the 
responsibility for dealing with their animals, and the injuries they inflict, because they are 
unwilling to do so. 
3 
However, the Mateuses' argument contravenes the most basic principles of tort 
law. The Mateuses created the potentially injurious condition by acquiring the animal. 
They, as the animal's owners, are in a position to best control the animal and prevent it 
from harming or coming into contact with other persons. They are also best able to train 
the animal so as to prevent it from becoming aggressive. However, the Mateuses now 
deny any responsibility to control their animal or prevent it from harming others. 
Because the Mateuses did not take any steps to control their animal they can and should 
be held liable for failure to do so. 
Hi. The consequence of imposing a burden of controlling an animal will 
result in less animal bites and will place liability on the persons most 
able to prevent animal attacks. 
The Mateuses do not discuss the consequences that would follow should this Court 
impose a duty on animal owners to control their pets. If animal owners are required to 
control their pets and are held liable when their pet attacks another person and causes 
injury, animal owners will be more likely to control their animals and take steps to 
prevent attacks. The rule advocated by the Mateuses seeks to maintain the status quo in 
an environment where cat bites are common and where those injured by cat bites are 
required to bear the potentially devastating financial and physical burden of the animal 
attacks. The position asserted by the Mateuses is unjust. 
4 
The Mateuses argue that, if controlled or supervised properly by their owners, cats' 
effectiveness as mousers may become diminished. The Mateuses presented only 
unsupported evidence to the district court in their summary judgment motion and on 
appeal that controlling cats will diminish their effectiveness as mousers. In this modern 
age, it is speculative, at best, to argue that cats are even used primarily as mousers. With 
the advent of traps, poisons and exterminators it may be that most cat owners do not rely 
on their animals to control the rodent population. Moreover, there is no evidence that the 
Mateuses allowed their animal to roam about their neighborhood uncontrolled so that it 
could act as a mouser. Therefore, the Mateuses' argument should be rejected. 
Mrs. Jackson argues that cat owners must be required to control their animals in 
order to prevent attacks and damages such as she has had to endure. In complete 
disregard for the extreme injuries and damages which their animal has inflicted in Mrs. 
Jackson, the Mateuses argue that cats must be left alone and allowed to wander around in 
order to kill rodents. However, without evidence of any rodent problem in the Salt Lake 
Valley, considerations involving human safety and prevention of animal attacks must take 
precedence over the Mateuses' unwillingness to control or supervise their animals, even if 
it is disguised under the pretense of letting their cat roam about for the public good. 
The Court is being asked to determine which of the parties' considerations should 
be given more weight. Certainly, matters regarding human safety and prevention of 
5 
injuries by animals should be given great weight by the Court.2 Cat's alleged duties as 
mousers must be given much less weight in comparison to the value of human safety and 
welfare. 
iv. Voluntary conduct which increases the risk of harm. 
The Mateuses mistakenly assume that this category addresses Mrs. Jackson's 
actions of outstretching her hand to their cat. (See, p. 9 of Appellees' Brief, wiBy 
voluntarily outstretching her arm to any animal, including a cat, plaintiff increased the 
risk of harm to her....") However, it is clear from the context which this category is used 
in AMS Salt Indus., 942 P.2d at 320, that it refers only to the tortfeasor's voluntary 
actions which may act to create a duty to another, and not to the voluntary actions of the 
injured claimant. This category is inapplicable to the facts of this case. Mateuses did not 
perform some voluntary conduct which increased the risk of harm to Mrs. Jackson. The 
Mateuses had a legal duty to control their cat and the exercise of that control was not a 
2
 See e ^ , Bunnell v. Railway Co., 44 P. 927, 930 (Utah 1896), where the 
plaintiff had turned his cattle upon the highway in the vicinity of a railway track, unattended, 
and one of them was killed by a passing train, and this Court said: "A proper regard for the 
safety of humanity and of property forbids that a person, should turn his beasts, which can 
neither reason nor appreciate danger, out upon the highway, without a keeper, in the vicinity 
of a railway crossing; and especially is this true where such person knows that they must 
cross the track to get to the pasture where their instinct leads them. The sacredness of 
human life, and common sense, alike dictate this rule." (Emphasis added.) 
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voluntary act that the Mateuses could ignore without legal consequences. Therefore, this 
issue is addressed only to clarify what appears to be a misapplication of the category by 
the Mateuses. 
v. General Policy Considerations. 
The Mateuses5 policy argument that cats must be left alone to roam at large for the 
benefit of society is without merit. There is no evidence in this case that leaving cats 
alone to roam about would benefit society in general. Utah statutory law and ordinances 
cited by Mrs. Jackson reveals a contrary policy of restraining animals and prohibiting 
them from inflicting injury and damages upon others.3 Moreover, as stated above safety 
and human welfare must take priority over a cat owners" alleged need to allow their cat to 
wander about unrestrained. 
b. Under the standards set out in Pullan v. Steinmetz, the cat bite 
was foreseeable even though the cat had not bitten anyone 
previously. 
It was erroneous for the district court to accept the Mateuses argument that 
because the cat allegedly had not bitten anyone before it attacked Mrs. Jackson, that an 
attack was unforeseeable. This fact is revealed by the warning contained in the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 518, comment h, which provides as follows: 
See, fn. 2, supra. 
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Animals dangerous under particular circumstances. One who keeps a 
domestic animal that possesses only those dangerous propensities that are 
normal to its class is required to know its normal habits and tendencies. He 
is therefore required to realize that even ordinarily gentle animals are 
likely to be dangerous under particular circumstances and to exercise 
reasonable care to prevent foreseeable harm. . . . 
This Court made it clear, in Pullan v. Steinmetz, 2000 UT 103, 16 P.3d 1245, that 
foreseeability of an animal attack does not depend on whether the animal has attacked a 
person on a prior occasion (although if there were a prior attack, that would impact the 
issue of whether another attack was foreseeable). The Court addressed whether the 
horse's bite was foreseeable in Pullan, and stated in its opinion as follows: 
Plaintiff does not contend that either defendant had any knowledge 
that she or other children from families that did not belong to the 
Association were entering the stables and feeding the horses without 
permission. Without knowing that or having reason to know that, a 
jury could not find defendants negligent. According to Rachel, Steinmetz 
had allowed her to ride Rocky on two occasions and had seen her feed 
Rocky, although it is not clear whether Rachel was feeding him out of her 
hands on those occasions. Steinmetz raised no objection to Rachel's feeding 
Rocky nor warned her of any danger. However, Rachel's family was a 
member of the Association, and Rachel had a right to frequent the stables. 
But, there is no evidence that Steinmetz knew that plaintiff or any other 
child whose family did not belong to the Association was accompanying 
Rachel to the stables and hand feeding the horses without permission 
or supervision. Simply maintaining a horse in a stable in a residential 
subdivision without any knowledge or any reason to know that a child 
from outside the Association was frequenting the stables and hand 
feeding the horses without permission or supervision is an insufficient 
basis on which to predicate negligence on the part of either defendant 
8 
TcL at * !^ n V: r 1248-49 (Emphasis added.) Hie Court did not discuss whether 
' ^ ..- me: u i iL di?u did not address the temperament of the horse 
species in oak - = * ... ^
 n i u Uti^ toreseeable. Rather, the focus on 
the issue of foreseeabilit} was properb •-• :- '•-•• i« •* MU - mat Uic p.aim i* 
or other children were entering the stables and feeding the hoiw *"*] ' in)' 
conlacl with the horse in situations where the owners were not there to prevent the harm. 
Ii ' •'•••' ' ».neiiuT ilic horse's owners and keepers had • 
foreknowledge that the .1. . an umcis in uncontrolled 
situations. 
Tn rhc present case, the determining factor loi deciding the foresivaK'-
]Ht -.".'.•^  . • .;:;atk i:> i.^ i - hether the cat has bitten anyone before, but rather whether 
the defendant, " 11M in h 1 ion 1.1 n .ai i 11 HIS, negligently allowed their cat to come into 
contact with other persons, thereb\ I"IV:H.I -;-,•• ^ lateuses could not 
prevent an attack because they were not there to supervise or e*H 1 M<>I 11n• M »m 1»1:11 1111 • 
undisputed laeb colore district court were that cats attack people and that cat bites are 
eoiiim *• 1'-' ' ] Mist- a-.-. • • .;L> viiv.; i,ot control their animal or take any steps to 
prevent the attack, and then Ii \ • s • ^ L rearguing articulated in 
Pullan \ . Steinmetz. dial the Mateuses" cat woui* \ ^ . ; :x -^  
Mateuses : nouid have not been granted summary judgment. Moreover, t 
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whether the cat attack was foreseeable involves a question of fact4 that could not have 
been properly resolved with a summary judgment motion, but should have been left for a 
jury to resolve. Under this Court's ruling in Pullen v. Steinmetz. the district court should 
not have ruled, as a matter of law, that the cat bite was unforeseeable, and the district 
court's judgment should be reversed. 
c. Under Utah law as set out in Looney v. Bingham Dairy, or the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 518, the Mateuses owed and 
breached their duty to Mrs. Jackson. 
Under both Utah law and the law set out in section 518 of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, the Mateuses should be held liable for failing to control their cat and 
for failing to prevent their cat's attack on Mrs. Jackson. Since the facts show that cat 
bites are not uncommon, a cat owner should know that they should take steps to prevent 
their animals from coming into contact with strangers in uncontrolled situations, and the 
Mateuses' argument that only speculation could lead them to believe that their cat could 
harm another fails to recognize the realities of animal ownership, and once again displays 
their uncaring attitude about the damages their animal has caused. 
"The care to be exercised in any particular case depends upon the 
circumstances of that case and on the extent of foreseeable danger involved and must be 
determined as a question of fact." DCR Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co.. 663 P.2d 433. 435 (Utah 
1983)(Emphasis added). See also Eaton v. Savage. 502 P.2d 564 (Utah 1972); Wheeler v. 
Jones. 431 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1967). 
10 
\ u^r hoonev v. Bingham Diary, 260 P.2d 855, 857 (Utah 1927), the Utah 
S''!••'-•*••:- . *.:.a \....;•:; - an an imal a t tack did not h a v e to p rove that an 
animal's owner kn^ " - ^ - attacks when the animal was not 
"rightly at the place where the injury occurred." This wise presents ; i: . I 
where the Mateuses' cat was not rightly at the place where the in jury occurred 1 1 le • 
... .n.^ cs argue, perhaps disingenuously, that the cat was "in a typical place"' while the 
facts show lli.il II il 'M.i.it Ii , l*u'k son s second story patio. Essentially, the 
Mateuses argue that their cat had •-
 t • -• ; property than did the 
Jacksons. Their argument cannot be accepted. The attac^ ^ on I I ^ f K U m i' . 
property, on her second story porch, right outside her living room sliding-glass door. 
Mrs heksoii . „ va. e;;; - because she mistook it for her own, cat. otherwise she 
would not have can • • .n «;;.*.u tiiat .:ieir cat had any right to 
be on Mrs. Jackson's property. There is no c ir r.-.. • .*•.*» aa^-ceuto 
i.n)\v the cat to come on her property. 
,:e; -xcsiatement (Second) of Torts. $518. and animal .'wner may be held liable 
iui harm done o- * . negligent in tailing to prevent the harm. The 
5
 The Mateuses* argument mat meir cat v\u.* an unwelcome trespasser only 
after it attacked Mrs. Jackson is false. The facts before the lower court were that Mrs. 
Jackson mistook the Mateuses* eat for her own. and it the moment she realized that the cat 
was not hers, the eat attacked '"lie Mateuses* cat was always an unwelcome trespasser<xil 
the Jackson's properu. 
Mateuses argue that they cannot be held liable under that negligence standard. However, 
negligence cases should only rarely be resolved on summary judgment Williams v. 
Melby, 699 P.2d 723 (Utah 1985), and then only in the most clear cut cases. It certainly 
should not have been used here when the evidence is conflicting regarding the likelihood 
of injury from cat bites, the impropriety of the Mateuses' allowing their cat to wonder 
about without any restraint or control, and whether the injury could have been prevented 
if the Mateuses had taken appropriate steps to control their cat. 
POINT II: BECAUSE CATS POSSESS PREDATORY TRAITS 
SIMILAR TO THOSE POSSESSED BY DOGS, CATS 
SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED ONE FREE BITE 
BEFORE LIABILITY IS IMPOSED ON THEIR 
OWNERS. 
The Court's reasons in Pullan for not extending that uDog Bite Statute" found in 
Utah Code Ann. § 18-1-1, while applicable to horses, do not withstand scrutiny when 
applied to other predatory animals such as cats. The Court set out its reasons for not 
extending the dog bite statute to horses as follows: 
We eschew the invitation to extend strict liability to owners and keepers of 
horses. The legislature imposed strict liability on owners and keepers of 
dogs for important reasons that would not support extending strict liability 
to owners and keepers of horses. Most importantly, while dogs are capable 
of injuring or killing poultry and small domestic livestock such as sheep 
and goats, horses do not have that predatory trait. Additionally, when 
section 18-1-1 was originally enacted in 1898, leash laws were not 
common and many dogs roamed at large without restraint. Domestic 
horses have not usually been allowed to roam free, but customarily have 
been corralled and pastured. Section 18-1-1 and section 18-1-3, which 
12 
allows any person to kill a dog that is attacking, chasing, or worry ing any 
domestic animal or fowl that has a commercial value, appear to have been 
enacted to protect the interests of those who raise poultn and livestock. 
Horses do not pose the same threat. None of !m reason- the legislature 
had for holding owners and keepers of dogs strictly liable would 
support our extending strict liability to owners and keepers of horses 
even when they are kept in a residential neu^K^-^^d :' - recreational 
purposes. 
Pullan. 1« v..<r I2--1-7 
i aix LM ..liigs, possess a predatory trait, and arc naturally equipped to kill other 
small animals, ;:'*.' r ^ jn-^quipped to cause considerable harm 
to human beings. Moreover, like dogs (w i-v -J .*:.»• • •. *•
 y \ .. ; . ,hat roamed 
at large without restraint, some cats now roam at large and are not »vstr:»'iin! ' at:,, like 
dogs, pose a certain threat to people. They are capable of attacking and harming people. 
and the exac* -- •• lis given In lite legislature for extending strict liability to dogs are :; 
applicable to cats as well. 
Mrs. Jackson conceded that in this case, she did n< •' hrm i ,i »m«,t* ul action lor 
st.net liability against the Mateuses. However, she asked the court to allow" her:. 
^ --M- ;. -.. i^giigciiL ny analogy, through use of the dog bite statute. 
Moreover, the statute i- ;- • J; . . . ... .:/uee « ** the court's decision, in 
that, Mrs. Jackson not only suiter^ the grave p "*• * • l ' :i- "A' misfortune oi Jcaiing 
with the consequences of the attack, but also ib denied any chana ' 
resfiifiihun ili.it she could have otherwise receive were she attacked and inpnvd b5 .!< 
This Court must redress the injustice that has been done to Mrs. Jackson, and reverse the 
district court's decision. 
POINT HI: THE SALT LAKE COUNTY ORDINANCES PROVIDE 
EVIDENCE OF THE MATEUSES' NEGLIGENCE. 
Read together and according to their plain language, Salt Lake County Ordinances, 
§§ 8.04.210, 8.24.010, and 8.24.030 impose liability on the owner or keeper of an animal, 
which is not properly restrained, that bites, inflicts injury, assaults, or attacks a human 
being on public or private property. The Mateuses complain that these ordinances impose 
strict liability on them for their cat's actions. However, that argument misses the point as 
Mrs. Jackson only seeks to use the ordinances to show evidence of the Mateuses' 
negligence. See, Adkins v. Uncle Bart's. Inc., 1 P.3d 528 (Utah 2000)(stating that 
violation of a safety standard set by statute or ordinance constitutes prima facie evidence 
of negligence.) 
The Mateuses argue that the plain interpretation of the ordinances, advocated by 
Mrs. Jackson, contravenes the legislative intent of the county council, but they provide no 
legislative history to support their claim. The ordinances are completely in harmony with 
the Dog Bite Statute and the Mateuses fail to explain how the ordinances and statute are 
in disharmony. The Dog Bite Statute imposes strict liability on dog owners when their 
dog injures someone, and the ordinances impose liability when other animals do the 
same. Essentially, the ordinances, without affecting the dog bite statute, eliminate the one 
14 
!*'••'•. . . . i _.i-.: L.'
 ;i - «hcr animals, just as ihe dog ^itc statute did in regard to 
dogs. I W1 d . f • • . . . : ••umpatible, well-matched and further the interests 
of justice by eliminating untv... • •• •" v.: MIS o fan ima l at tacks.6 
The purposes of the ordinances is to prevent animal n ; . U • 
owners to take steps to control their animals . If, as argued by the Mateuses , their purp* N*.. 
is • % AW pari of an owner after an injurious incident, then the 
ordinances fail ' ••*: • < note saiei\ ai.o. well-being. Clearly, the 
Court should not interpret the ordinances * * hem useless or in a 
manner which is not expressly stated in their plain language. ''! - :-^-
... u-\ as expressed m their plain language, is to prevent such attacks, and noi :-:^ t *o 
remi ;•' — r .-_ . .^ vi ;;.Kiry occur. Therefore, the Mateuses' 
interpretation should be reject, . • -. ,, .. jaekson to use the 
ordinances to show evidence of the Mateuses' neglipen^e. 
Cat owners can and should know that their animals can act viciously bec: -
biles ;nv common ». nts an* predaior\ animal and thev possess sharp teeth and claws. 
Moreover; cat owners should kit :;,.; animus to wander about 
unsupervised, the animals will come into contact * ' . ; ' • * r- i:iu .a: ;iere is a 
i he Mateuses" constitutional arguments shoiuu ue disregarded. No 
constitutional issues were appealed to this Court, and Judge Medley's order specifically 
stated that no decision was rendered regarding the Mateuses" constitutional arguments. 
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foreseeable possibility that the animal can attack and injure another person. Cat owners 
should be held responsible for allowing their animals to wander outside their homes 
uncontrolled and unsupervised, and the burden should not be placed on innocent third-
parties to control the animals or deal with the financial consequences of an animal attack. 
Justice demands that the decision granting the Mateuses' summary judgment be reversed, 
and this case should be remanded for trial. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the judgment of the district court which granted 
summary judgment for the Mateuses. The facts of this case show that the Mateuses were 
negligent in allowing their cat to come into contract with Mrs. Jackson, and that they had 
a duty to exercise reasonable care to properly control their animal. The facts show that 
they breached their duty and allowed their cat to cause Mrs. Jackson's injuries. 
DATED this / day of January, 2002. 
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